New Trends and Risks of Collective Security as a Road to Peace

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the decline of Soviet power during the late eighties put an end to Bipolarity which characterized the global scenario after World War II. It also symbolized the rise of the US as the single planetary super-power thus transforming world order into a Unipolar System. Notwithstanding the aforementioned, during the past two decades the world has witnessed US’ difficulty in consolidating such Pax Americana. US’ vulnerability evidenced by S-11 was nothing else but a symptom of such difficulty. The never-ending Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the growing tension in the Middle East after Iran’s pursuit of nuclear power, the tensions between India and Pakistan, Russian comeback to the geopolitical battle over natural resources in Asia and South America, the complexity of Iraq’s and Afghanistan’s terrorist threat, the menace of North Korea, among other examples, portray an image under which the US will unlikely be able to guarantee peace on its own in case of need. The US requires of international cooperation to reach its goals. Plus, the startling economic growth of India and China during the past 15 years has put such countries once again in the first page of world politics. For the first time in more than 3 centuries world supremacy is heading eastward. A possible interpretation of the world under this trend is that the first decade of 21st century has been characterized by a Multilateral System of international order.

Pursuant to the collective security theories of international peace, it may be argued that the new world order is more likely to achieve peace under a collective security scheme, given the following reasons: (a) no country has an hegemonic power as to destabilize world security, provided that the other countries comply with their duties under the covenants of collective security agreements, (b) almost every existing sovereign state in the planet is bound today by the obligations derived from the UN charter, thus reducing risks such as: (i) the possibility of aggressor countries to purchase raw materials and weapons to non-member states of the UN, (ii) the impossibility to impose legitimate sanctions over aggressor countries not bound by the UN Charter, (iii) the possibility of aggressor countries to find new markets for their own products, and (iv) non compliance with the need of pacific solution of controversies between disputing parties; (c) the high value that global citizens give to the reach of peace, thus mobilizing pressure groups which influence their own sovereign states, pursuant to the reach of peace, (d) the increase of information sources and global communication networks, thus improving information asymmetries and civil society’s monitoring activities over public officers, (e) the depth of the wounds left by WWI and WWII, thus compelling nations to prevent future wars, (f) the growth and deepening of regional security and commercial agreements, as additional mechanisms which deter confronted parties of going to war, (g) a shift – whatsoever not so clear – of American foreign policy, from Bush-Cheney’s Unilateralism to Obama’s Multilateral collaborationism, (h) the increasing economic interdependence between world super powers, which would make more costly for them to go to war that restraining to do so, (i) the increasing importance of the ICC as a punishment and deterrence instrument, and (j) the initial success of the UN in promoting a meeting between the US, Britain, France, Germany, China and Russia, to discuss Iran’s nuclear programme.

Certain difficulties seem to arise under this new scope. The ones that I found most relevant are: (a) The pursuit of nuclear power by several countries which – under the sovereign equality principle – have (at least in principle) equal right to use nuclear power (and weapons?), (b) the aggressive attitude of states which read Obama’s Multilateralism as a sign of weakness, (c) UN’s fragility and its impossibility to solve disputes between – or involving the interest of – superpowers, (d) the lack of existence of a world army completely dependent of the UN and not its member states, (e) the lack of institutionalization of a means to impose liability to the UN and its officers for negligence or misconduct in connection with UN’s duty to safeguard peace, (e) the rise of new powers which appeal to their military strength (i.e. China’s military display of weaponry last week in the celebration of the Peoples Republic 60th anniversary) as an implicit message to support their goals, v.g. China’s claim over certain Japanese islands, Taiwan, the South China Sea, or the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, (f) the readiness of certain countries, like China (once again), to put their economic self interest (the purchase of millions or barrels of oil and gas each year) ahead of common sense – as the US did in the Italo-Ethiopian affair – by its reluctance to contemplate sanctions against Iran.

The question ahead of us is if the UN really has the power to solve conflicts involving great powers or if it is doomed by the selfishness and egotism of the governments and economic elites of powerful countries? UN’s actions involving Iran, North Korea, China, Russia, and indeed the US, during the next years, will be a clear sign of the future of world efforts towards the reach of peace? Or are we, instead, witnessing the birth of a new world war era, taking into account Russia’s and China’s indifference to Iran’s pursuit for nuclear power? The resemblance between the Italo-American commercial relation before WWII, and the commercial interdependence between China, Russia, and Iran in our times is, to put it clear, frightening.